

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST.

NO. 1.

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and ors.

- AGAINST -  
AKAKI, SADAO, and ors.

I, GEORGE ERNEST RAMSAY of Sydney in the State of New South Wales, make oath and say as follows:-

1. I was NX34999, Lt. Colonel George Ernest Ramsay, 2/30 Australian Infantry Battalion when I was captured by the Japanese at Singapore in February 1942.
2. I was transferred to the 2/18 Battalion on a day in April, 1942 I left there with A Force which was a force of 3000 under Brigadier Varley. We were to move overseas to an unknown destination. I was in command of 1 Bn. of A Force. It consisted of about 850 all ranks. We embarked on the CELEBES MARU with 1000 troops which included my own 1 Bn and a detachment from the 2/4 CCS. The remaining 2000 embarked on the TOYASHI MARU under Brigadier Varley. Before leaving we were told that the force would go to the same destination as the other one but in fact 1000 men were dropped at Victoria Point on the extreme tip of lower Burma, and the next 1000 with me were dropped at MEGUI.
3. The remaining 1000 under Brigadier Varley were disembarked at TAVOY.
4. We got to Tavoy in late August or September, 1942. Brigadier Varley was still there with portion of the original 1000 but he was in a separate camp and I was denied official access to him.
5. On leaving TAVOY we moved to THANBUYZYAT by rail and also on foot. This was in December, 1942. Colonel NAGATOMO had his headquarters at THANBUYZYAT and when I was at THANBUYZYAT Brig. Varley had established his own headquarters there. He stayed in THANBUYZYAT for a night or two and then moved to 26 Kilo Camp. Letherto we had been with Jap front line troops; but on arrival at 26 Kilo camp we had our first experience with Koreans as guards. They were pretty bad.
6. A Jap sergeant named FANATO was there; a Jap engineer officer also was there and they were insistent on a certain number of our men going out to work each day. I wrote to them several times and made verbal protests against the numbers of men being required and setting out the reasons why their requests were impossible of fulfilment. He threatened on several occasions, and did on several occasions parade the whole camp and selected the men himself. This was the Jap officer. We were sometimes, however, able to substitute

or these men other men whom the M.O. regarded as fitter than the ones picked out by the Jap officer. Throughout, the question of work quotas was one of daily dispute and trouble.

7. From 26 Kilo camp we moved to 75 Kilo camp, called MEILOE. There we struck a worse crowd of Korean guards than at 26 camp. There was a lot of indiscriminate bashing there though no serious injuries were sustained. The health of the men was poor. Men would be required to leave the camp early in the morning and would not return until 2 or 3 the next morning; then they would be compelled to leave again the same morning shortly after dawn. Occasionally protests to the Japs resulted in some of the men being given an extra hour or two of rest. The rainy season there, men often worked in mud up to their knees and they had no change of clothing. Meals were only fair.

8. The Jap engineer soldiers ill-treated the men a lot by hitting them with bamboos, their fists and rifle butts, through no fault of the men but due to the impatience of the Japs who could not understand that the men did not understand what was being required of them all of the time.

9. Jap Commander there was Lieut. HOSHI. I had my own force - Ramsay force and Black and Green forces.

10. Korean guards apparently under instructions from the camp commander often forced men out to work. HOSHI would often promise that they would not be sent out without the concurrence of our M.O.s but he failed to pass those instructions on to his Korean administrative staff apparently, anyway. So, when the work party was formed in the morning, he would not be available, and the Koreans would deny that they had received instructions from their commander. On one occasion I went up and found him in the grounds just as a party of our men just selected were being sent out. I reminded him of his promise, pointed out the men to him, and he ordered them back to camp. However, he seemed to take great care subsequently that he was never about the place when other parties were going out. In this camp we had about 10 deaths.

11. We moved to 105 Kilo camp, called AUNGANAUNG, in April or May 1943, and remained there for seven months. It was there we struck tropical ulcers pretty badly, a lot of the men getting them. There was a hospital back at 55 Kilo called the Death Camp. Some men were sent back there for amputation. There were over 100 amputation cases and some died after the operation. The M.O.s. at 105 Kilo camp were Captains Cumming, Higgin, Anderson and White; they were all A.A.M.C. Our camp in strength varied between the 2000 and 2500 mark. Of my original force of 1000 men I lost 128; I put my deaths down at 15%. There were 158 deaths at the 105 Kilo camp from the mixed force in the seven months. There were instances of men being knocked about by the Japs and the Koreans with bamboos and other things, necessitating medical treatment. Koreans were particularly brutal. If they wanted to punish a man they would

strike him anywhere at all, and on half healed ulcers. They have kicked men on the shins and the shins had ulcers on them. I saw Japs screw a stick into a man's navel. Lt. HOSHI was commander there.

12. Ulcers extended from knee to ankle, exposing the shinbone for 8 or 9 inches. They went black. I have seen ulcers cover a whole foot. The question of iodiform was a pressing one throughout and once one of my men said he had been offered a small jar of iodiform by a Jap in exchange for his watch. He had been pestered several times to exchange his watch but as it was a present from his mother he did not want to let it go. However, in order to relieve his friend's suffering from ulcers he finally let it go for the bottle of iodiform from the Jap. I told the Jap Commander that the bottle could only have been obtained by illegal means by his men. The exchange was made in the presence of the Jap Commander. The iodiform was in a bottle about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches by 3 inches. Our M.O. said there was enough in it to last several weeks. There was no label on it.

13. At the 105 camp there was a lot of dysentery and some malaria. We had 3 to 4 cholera deaths there. There were no medical supplies; we tried to get emetine from as far back as MERGUI but never could.

14. In December, 1943, after completion of the railway, we moved to TAMAKAN.

15. There was a statement that the railway had to be put down at all costs - responsibility for that was with Col. NAGATOMO, who was i/c of No. 3 Branch, which took in our A Force, and Co. Williams' force which had come from Java.

16. Later Col. NAKALUHA, who took Col. NAGATOMO'S place, spoke in similar terms. He said we were only a rabble army and that we were dependent on the Jap Imperial Army for our safety. NAGATOMO had once read out some such statement in Japanese and then his interpreter read it out in English. There are copies of this; copies were left with us.

17. NAGATOMO came out to the camp on one or two occasions, but did not go right through. At no time did he interview me in the latter stages, or ask if I had any complaints generally. Neither of these two Jap Commanders ensured that their instructions, whatever they were after I had had early interviews with them, were carried out. Perhaps they all of the time had no intention of giving these instructions. There always seemed to be a general desire on the part of Japanese Commanders to evade responsibility. Hoski would send his batman out, if we called, to say Hoski was indisposed and could not be disturbed. Once we arrived too quickly for him; we got onto the verandah of his cottage and through the window saw him just getting into bed, clothed, with his boots on. He came out subsequently and saw us. But that was

1. IS dodge.

18. On 1 January, 1944, we reached TAMARKAN. It was alleged to be a rest camp. Food for the first few months was a considerable improvement on anything we had had. There were not many troops there when we arrived, but troops came all of the time out of the jungle from the jungle carps and by May there must have been about 5000 troops there.

19. There were constant irritation tactics and minor bashings. These were daily occurrences. At one time the camp commander was MATSUSAKI. No indication was ever given to me by the Japs of any change in their command there.

20. In August, 1944, the Japs re-organised their groups. Colonel Anderson, who had taken Brig. Varley's place, took over command from me.

21. There were some deaths at Tararkan. In the "black month" we lost about 2 a day; we took dead bodies straight from the trucks. Dysentery and fever and malnutrition caused most of the deaths. We had no quinine or atebrin. There was a Jap M.O. at NAGATOMO's headquarters who occasionally visited the camp, and once more in their usual style they agreed that the men were very sick; but I was told by the commander later that the men were fit to work because his M.O. had so reported. The name of the Jap M.O. was HIGUCHI. The M.O. at Tamarkhan was NOBOSAWA. I believe neither of them had any medical background. HIGUCHI was a dentist and NOBOSAWA a vet. Our senior M.O. was Col. Hamilton. For most of the time, before Col. Hamilton, Major Hobbs was our M.O. at TAMARKAN.

22. We remained at TAMARKAN until February, 1945, when they separated officers from Ors.

23. We were moved to KANBU.I; a party of 3,000, including Australian, British, American and Dutch. All officers. They moved the officers on a 6-day trip by river and on foot to a new camp, and parties went in batches of 500. Five parties already had left at intervals of 5 days each. I reached BANGKOK on the night we were notified that the war was over. The camp site was on the other side of BANGKOK.

24. Lieut NITO, Chief of Staff of NAGOTOMO, once visited our camp. Normally he had been drinking before his arrival. He told Major Green, Col. Black and me that he could promise us an honourable death, and that if things went bad he would shoot us himself. /

TAKEN AND SWORN AT SYDNEY ON THE TENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER,  
1946. BEFORE ME /s/ R. L. Deasey, J.P.

/s/ G. E. Ramsay.